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There are at least seven different well-known interpretations of Sophist 259E4-6. In this paper I 
show them to be either misleading, in conflict with the context, or at odds with Plato’s project in 
the dialogue. I argue that 259E4-6 tells us that in view of the fact that statements consist in the 
weaving of different linguistic terms that stand for different extra-linguistic items, if there is to be 
statements, then reality must consist in a plurality of items some of which mix with some and 
some of which do not mix with some according to certain ontological rules.  My argument for this 
construal of Sophist 259E4-6 involves an analysis of the passage as well as an assessment of how 
that text fits into its context. 
 
 
(1) (1.1) Τελεωτάτη piάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις (1.2) τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀpiὸ piάντων·  (2) 
(2.1) διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλλων τῶν εἰδῶν συµpiλοκὴν (2) (2.2) ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡµῖν, (259E4-6). 
“(1) (1.1) A most complete disappearance of all statements is (1.2) the undoing of each thing 
from everything [else], (2) (2.1) because on account of the Weaving together of Forms with one 
another, (2.2) statements have come to be for us.”  
This short passage has been subject to various interpretations, some of them 
radically different from one another. I find those interpretations either misleading or 
unsatisfying and would like to propose yet a different construal that, unlike its 
forerunners, I believe not only is consistent but also in harmony with the context, as well 
as philosophically interesting and illuminating.  
I will start by (I) reviewing the interpretations of Cornford, Moravcsik, Ross, 
Bluck, Ackrill, and Peck, and then move on to criticize them by studying the passage in 
its immediate context (II, III), as well as its (IV) composition and (V) relationship to 
previous sections of the dialogue. (VI) I will also briefly consider what the Eleatic Visitor 
thinks statements (λόγοι) are, and this will pave the way to (VII) an explanation of what 
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he assumes is the relationship between statements and the Weaving of Forms (i.e. 
reality). I will conclude (VIII) by summarizing the results of (I)-(VII) and explaining 
what exactly “Weaving together of Forms” in 259E4-6 means, whether that meaning 
commits Plato to the view that a Weaving of Forms underlies every statement, and what 
does it mean for the Weaving together of Forms to be a necessary condition for 
statements.  
 
(I) The many different views about 259E4-6 
 
Sophist 259E4-6 has been subject to a plethora of interpretations. The seven most 
prominent are the following:  
(i) Cornford (1935, 300-301, 314) thinks that at Sophist 259E4-6 Plato is telling us that 
every statement (λόγος)1 depends on the Weaving together of Forms (from now on WF) 
in the sense that every statement ‘contains’ a WF, and there cannot be a statement 
without such a WF.  However, when he confronts the statement “Theaetetus is sitting” 
(263A2), Cornford downgrades his claim and says that every statement must contain at 
least one Form represented by a common or predicate term. Cornford does not explain 
how according to 259E4-6 a WF should underlie every statement, nor for that matter how 
he extracts from that text that at least a term of every statement stands for a Form (1935, 
300). Moreover, Cornford is inconsistent when he affirms in the same breath that every 
statement ‘contains’ a WF and—as he implies—that some statements ‘contain’ only one 
Form (1935, 314). This cannot be right, because a WF, insofar as it is a weaving of 
                                                 
*Parts of this paper were presented and discussed at the Reykjavík Academy. I thank the audience 
for their comments. Geir þórarinsson, from the University of Iceland, not only organized the talk 
but gave me invaluable feedback and comments at the presentation and in private conversation. 
1
 Cornford, F. M. Plato’s Theory of Knowledge (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1935) p. 300 
translates λόγος as ‘discourse’. His translation of Soph. 259E4-6 runs: “Any discourse we can 
have owes its existence to the weaving together of Forms.” To this he comments: “It is not meant 
that Forms are the only elements in the meaning of all discourse. We can also make statements 
about Particulars. But it is true that every statement must contain at least one Form.” 
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Forms, must involved at least two Forms,2 and a statement that only ‘contains’ one form 
cannot ‘contain’ a WF.  
(ii) Ross (1951, 115), like Cornford, takes Plato to believe that a statement must contain 
at least a term that stands for a Form. He also recognizes that the predicate term normally 
stands for a Form, while the subject term is normally a proper name that stands for a 
particular. However, unlike Cornford, Ross explicitly considers the phrase “all discourse 
depends on the weaving together of Forms” to be an overstatement, for it is not 
compatible with the example “Theaetetus is sitting.”  
(iii) Moravcsik (1960, 117-118) agrees with Cornford on “rational discourse” being made 
possible by the WF in the sense that a plurality of woven Forms underlies each 
meaningful sentence. However, Moravcsik has a totally different view about the 
constitution of that WF. He (1960, 126) thinks that the parallelism Plato draws between 
the WF and the Weaving of Letters, whereby consonants are connected by vowels 
(252E9-253A6), indicates that in statements like “Change3 is not Rest” two underlying 
consonant-Forms and one underlying vowel-Form are involved. That becomes clearer, 
according to Moravcsik, if we bear in mind that “Change is not Rest” is for Plato 
equivalent to “Change partakes of the Different4 in relation to Rest,” where the terms 
‘Motion’, ‘Different’, and ‘Rest’ indicate that three Forms are involved. The same applies 
to “Justice is a Virtue”, which should be equivalent to “Justice partakes of Virtue,” and 
where again three Forms are involved (1960, 126-127). However, “Theaetetus is sitting,” 
which should be equivalent to “Theaetetus partakes in sitting” and “sitting is in relation to 
                                                 
2
 Ackrill, J. L. Essays on Plato an Aristotle (Oxford University Press 2001) p. 73 notices that 
Cornford drops ἀλλήλλων in his translation of the passage and points out that that is perhaps 
motivated by the fact that “Theaetetus is flying” does not appear to contain a plurality of Forms. 
3
 Moravcsik, M. E. J. “Συµpiλοκὴ Εἰδῶν and the Genesis of λόγος,” Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie (1960) 42 (2): 117-129 uses the term ‘Motion’. Considering that κίνησις is a general 
term that includes motion as well as substantial and qualitative change, I prefer to translate 
‘Change’. 
 
4(Τhe) ‘Other’ is Moravcsik’s (1960) translation of (τὸ) ἕτερον, which I will be translating as 
(the) ‘Different’. 
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Theaetetus” (cf. the parallel “Not-being is in relation to Change” equivalent to “Change 
partakes in Not-being” at 256D11-12), does not stand for a WF involving three Forms, 
but only two. The WF involved in this case is such that the consonant Form for which the 
predicate term “sitting” and the particular for which the subject term “Theaetetus” stands 
are connected by the vowel Form for which the copula “is,” or “is in relation to,” stands. 
In a nutshell (1962, 61), in Moravcsik’s view, the WF is a necessary ontological 
condition for statements because statements must contain at least one Form that functions 
as connector of Subject – which may stand for a Form or particular—and a Predicate—
which normally stands for a Form –. For that reason, ‘is’ in statements such as 
‘Theaetetus is sitting’ stands for a Form.  
(iv) Ackrill (1997, 1955) has a different and more sophisticated approach. The point of 
259E4-6, according to him, is not whether a WF underlies every statement, but rather that 
the WF is a necessary condition for significant non-self-contradictory and non-
tautological statements. It is a necessary condition for significant non-self-contradictory 
statements because if all Forms combined, self-contradictory statements like “κίνησις 
ἵσταναι” would follow and be true. And it is also a necessary condition for significant 
non-tautological statements because if Forms did not combined, only tautological 
statements would be possible. For that reason, according to Ackrill’s interpretation, if 
there is to be significant non-self-contradictory and non-tautological statements, Forms 
must weave with one another in such a way that some combine with some and some do 
not combine with some. The statement “Theaetetus is sitting,” for instance, is meaningful 
because the Forms (i.e. concepts) it contains include and rule out other Forms 
(concepts).5 So in Ackrill’s view, a WF need not necessarily underlie statements but all 
                                                 
5
 Ackrill’s (2001) view, as Moravcsik (1960, 121, n. 8) points out, raises the question whether for 
Plato all predicates fall into ranges of incompatibles. In addition to Ackrill (2001), Demos R. The 
Philosophy of Plato (Scribner’s 1939), Lorenz, K. and J. Mittelstrass. “Theaetetus fligt,” Archiv 
für Geschichte der Philosophie (1966) 48 (1-3) 113-143, Philip J. “False Statement in the 
Sophistes,” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Society (1968) 99 315-
327, Kostman, J. “False Logos and Not-Being in Plato’s Sophist,” in J. M. E. Moravcsik (ed.), 
Patterns in Plato’s Thought (Reidel 1973) 192-212, Sayre, K. Plato’s Late Ontology: A Riddle 
Resolved (Princeton University Press 1983), Bluck, R. S. “False Statement in the Sophist,” The 
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statements presuppose the WF, and the WF involves both compatibility and 
incompatibility of Forms.6 
 All the previous interpretations are more or less on the same footing in 
understanding the WF as a weaving that involves in some way or another Forms such as 
Being, Sameness, Difference, Change, and Rest. Other interpretations, however, take 
εἰδῶν in WF (τὴν ἀλλήλλων εἰδῶν συµpiλοκὴν) not to refer to Forms. 
(v) Bluck (1957, 182) criticizes Ackrill for being inconsistent. He thinks one cannot 
claim that discourse depends on the fact that Forms are interwoven with one another and 
mean by that that some Forms do not combine or mix.  In Bluck’s view, the WF is only 
about compatibility and not about incompatibility.7 He supports this by pointing out that 
in the Weaving of Letters (252E9-253A6) nothing is said of letters not mixing, and in the 
comparison between the Weaving of Letters and the Weaving of Parts of Speech (261D 
ff.) the emphasis is on compatibility, not on incompatibility. Bluck thus thinks that the 
WF of 259E4-6 is not to be exclusively identified with the mixing of Forms and the 
structure of the world of Forms. It includes that, as well as “the way we weave Forms 
                                                                                                                                                 
Journal of Hellenistic Studies  (1957) 77 (2) 181-186, and Pelletier, F. J. Parmenides, Plato, and 
the Problem of Not-Being (The University of Chicago Press 1990) defend an ‘incompatibility’ 
notion of negation in the Sophist. Other interpreters strongly dispute this view, e.g. Frede, M. 
“Prädikation und Existenzaussage,” Hyponmemata (1967) 18, Owen, G. E. L. “Plato on Not-
Being,” in G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology (Anchor Books 1970) p.  223-
267, Lee, E. “Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist,” Philosophical Review (1972) 81 
(3):  267-304, and Ray, A. For Images: An Interpretation of Plato’s Sophist (University Press of 
America 1984). For a treatment of this discussion see Pelletier (1990: 38-44).  
6
 Ackril (2001) calls the Forms ‘concepts’. He must be using the term ‘concept’ in Fregean 
fashion, considering ‘concepts’ as objects that are the referents of predicates. However, ‘concept’ 
is sometimes taken to be a constituent of a thought and a mental representation. Forms in contrast 
are realities of their own totally independent of human affairs. For this reason it may be 
misleading to refer to Forms as concepts. It is also highly disputable whether Fregean concepts 
are totally thought independent. Although for Frege a thought may be a proposition and not a 
psychological event, it is odd to think that the thought ‘Pegasus flies’ is a totally thought 
independent reality as it is the case of Mont Everest. 
7
 To say the least, Bluck’s (1957) view that the WF is only about combining and compatibility is 
baffling. It will become apparent, as my arguments develop, that WF involves both mixing and 
non-mixing. 
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together when we talk.” The WF involved at 259E4-6, for Bluck, is a weaving together of 
names that Stand for Forms.8 Statements about Particulars, e.g. “Theaetetus is sitting,” 
involve two or more Forms because the Subject term somehow stands for the Form Man 
insofar as Theaetetus somehow unpacks into a list of all the Forms of which he partakes.  
(vi) Hackforth (1945, 57, footnote 2), in contrast to Bluck, argues that the weaving of 
words or parts of speech at 262C6 (συµpiλοκή) and 262D4 (συµpiλέκειν) shows that in 
the WF (συµpiλοκή εἴδων) at 259E4-6 the εἴδη in question are not Forms (e.g. Being, 
Sameness, Difference, Change, and Rest) but words, and therefore it is just words that are 
woven in the WF of 259E4-6.  
(vii) Peck (1962, 53-54) offers yet a different WF. For him the passage is not about 
mixings underlying statements or mixings of Forms being a condition for statements. He 
points out that the WF that precedes the passage is strictly about Rest mixing with Being, 
Sameness, and Difference, about Change mixing with Being, Sameness, Difference, and 
Rest, about all Forms mixing with Being, Sameness, and Difference, and about Sameness 
and Difference mixing respectively with Being. This WF can hardly be compared with 
“Theaetetus is sitting” and ‘Forms’ such as Man and Sitting. For this reason the WF of 
259E4-6 cannot be the one that precedes the passage but that of 260C11-261A4, where 
εἶδος, he suggests, need not be a Form such as Being, Change, Rest, Difference, and 
Sameness, and includes Man and Sitting. There, the weaving in question is that of some 
εἶδος with Being, and it is thanks to that weaving that the εἶδος in question has being.  
The point made at 259E4-6 is then, in Peck’s view, that (a) there is a weaving together 
among the Form Being and all other Forms in virtue of which all those other Forms have 
being, (b) the Form of Statement is among those ‘all other Forms,’ (c) it then follows that 
the Form of Statement weaves with the Form of Being and has being insofar as it weaves 
together with or partakes in the Form of Being.  
                                                 
8
 Ross, D. Plato’s Theory of Ideas (Clarendon Press 1951) p. 115 slips into this view when he 
paraphrases 259E4-6 as “all discourse depends on the weaving of Forms by the speaker or 
thinker.” 
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There is much to be criticized in all of these interpretations. I will, however, focus 
my criticism on what is strictly relevant for the understanding of 259E4-6.  
 
(II) Rebuttal of Bluck’s, Hackforth’s and Peck’s views, and context 259E4-6 
 
It is astonishing how many construals and interpretations three Stephanus lines 
can have! At first blush the culprit seems to be the expression “the Weaving of Forms 
with one another” (τὴν ἀλλήλλων τῶν εἰδῶν συµpiλοκὴν), and it appears we need a 
clear grasp of what WF means, in order to produce a convincing interpretation of the 
whole passage and how the WF determines statements.9 
As we have just seen, Cornford, Moravcsik, Ross, Ackrill took the WF at 259E5-
6 to look back at the Weaving together of Forms such as Being, Sameness, Difference, 
Change, and Rest at 254B-258C. Hackforth took it to look forward to the weaving 
together of words at 262C6-262D4, Bluck to look forward to that very same weaving of 
words, though he associates that weaving to the analysis of statements at 261C-263D and 
emphasizes that it is a weaving together of words that stand for Forms. Peck in contrast, 
takes the WF to look forward to a weaving of all Forms with the Form Being at 260C11-
261A4. 
Hackforth, Bluck, and Peck find some support in the fact that εἶδος need not 
mean Form,10 and the fact that Plato does talk about a ‘primary weaving of words’, i.e. 
                                                 
9
 Other instances of συµpiλοκή and συµpiλέκειν in the Sophist are to be found at 240C2-3, where 
the subject matter is the weaving of Not-Being with Being, at 242D7-E2 in reference to weaving 
by making Being many and one, and both at 262C5-7 and 262D2-6 in reference to the weaving of 
words. Συµpiλέξαντες at 268C6 is used idiomatically in the sense of ‘to wrap up (the 
discussion)’. 
10
 It is true that εἶδος need not be a technical term. It is also true that it is open to discussion 
whether at 255D4 εἰδοῖν, which picks up on τὰ αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά and τὰ piρὸς ἄλλα in 255C14-
15, simply means “two classes” or implies that the two classes involved are of the same kind and 
ontological rank as Being, Sameness, Difference, etc. Nonetheless, it is hard to believe that εἰδῆ 
in τὴν ἀλλήλλων τῶν εἰδῶν συµpiλοκὴν are not meant in technical sense, for τὴν ἀλλήλλων 
τῶν εἰδῶν συµpiλοκὴν is itself a technical or philosophically loaded expression. 
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nouns and verbs, that constitutes primary or basic statements (262B9-C7). Additionally, 
the whole stretch of text 258C-259D, insofar as it is a transitional passage, seems to look 
backward and forward. This explains why interpreters wobble between a backward and 
forward looking construal of τὴν ἀλλήλλων τῶν εἰδῶν συµpiλοκὴν.  
Indeed, 259E4-6 has a very particular location in the Sophist. It is inserted 
between the treatment of the Weaving together of the Forms Being, Sameness, Different, 
Change, and Rest (251C-258C) and an explanation of false statements (261C-263D). The 
stretch of text 258C-260B, in which 259E4-6 is inserted, is a “Summary of the case 
against Parmenides.”11  That summary has five parts: (i) Parmenides is declared to have 
been rebutted (258C7-E5), (ii) the WF is reviewed and presented as a theory that solves 
the difficulties imposed by Parmenides’ theory (258E6-259B8, cf. 251E-252C9, 254B-D 
and 258E6-259B7), (iii) those who do not comply with that theory are criticized for 
arguing poorly (259B9-D8), (iv) difficulties implied by the lack of a WF are mentioned 
(259D9-E7), and (v) the treatment of the nature of statements is introduced (260A1-
260B2). Within this context, 259E4-6 appears to represent a climax-point in the 
discussion, and that is confirmed by the literary construction of the passage. 
(1) (1.1) Τελεωτάτη piάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις (1.2) τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀpiὸ piάντων·  (2) 
(2.1) διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλλων τῶν εἰδῶν συµpiλοκὴν (2) (2.2) ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡµῖν, (259E4-6). 
“(1) (1.1) A most complete disappearance of all statements is (1.2) the undoing of each thing 
from everything [else], (2) (2.1) because on account of the Weaving together of Forms with one 
another, (2.2) statements have come to be for us.” 
The first colon of (1), i.e. (1.1), talks about the nonexistence of statements, while 
the second colon of (2), i.e. (2.2), speaks of exactly the opposite, the existence of 
statements. Similarly, the second colon of (1), i.e. (1.2), speaks of things not being 
woven, while the first colon of (2), i.e. (2.1), talks of the WF, i.e. of things being woven. 
As a result, the text has an ABBA chiastic construction, where the first A, i.e. (1.1), is the 
negation of the second A, i.e. (2.2), and the first B, i.e. (1.2), is the negation of the second 
                                                 
11
 “Summary of the case against Parmenides” is the name Rijk L. M. Plato’s Sophist (North-
Holland Publishing Company) p. 1986 gives to 258C-260B. 
  9 
 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy Vol. VI 2012 Issue 2 
 
 
 
 
B, i.e. (2.1): -A-BBA. Such construction, at least in the eyes of an ancient reader, is the 
sort of flag that highlights a turning point or a climax. Hackforth, Bluck, and Peck did 
have a motive to construe εἰδῶν συµpiλοκήν looking forward to the next section on 
statements. Nonetheless, they cannot be right for both textual and philosophical reasons. 
The first thing to be noticed is that ‘WF’ (τὴν ἀλλήλλων τῶν εἰδῶν 
συµpiλοκήν) in (2.1) must be the opposite of ‘the undoing of each thing from everything 
else’ (τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀpiὸ piάντων) in (1.2). This ‘undoing of each thing from 
everything else’ does not come out of the blue at 259E4-6. It was just mentioned by the 
Eleatic Visitor five lines above: “…to try to separate everything from everything [else] 
(τό γε piᾶν ἀpiὸ piαντὸς ἐpiιχειpiεῖν ἀpiοχωρίζειν) is not sound and moreover proper of 
someone absolutely uneducated and non-philosophical” (259D9-E2). “To try to separate 
everything from everything” is precisely what is done by those who present contraries in 
their arguments and claim without any qualification that the same is different and the 
different is the same (259C9-D2). Since this treatment of contraries is tagged as “an 
obvious new-born of someone who just came into contact with things that are” (259D6-
7), Plato is clearly hitting at the Late Learners, who earlier in the dialogue were said not 
to allow for statements such as “man is good” because good is not (the same as) man and 
man is not (the same as) good (251B6-C6). The mistake committed by the Late Learners 
was diagnosed as ignoring qualifications on the way something (e.g. man, Not-Beig) is or 
is not (something, e.g. good) (see 258E6-259B7).12 
If people like the Late Learners “undo each thing from everything else” and “try 
to separate everything from everything [else]” because they do not make the proper 
qualifications needed to formulate statements and talk about Not-Being, and if the 
opposite of what they do is in 259E4-6 the WF, then the WF at stake in 259E4-6 must be 
                                                 
12
 Ackrill (2001) and Moravcsik, M. E. J. “Being and Meaning in the Sophist,” Acta Philosophica 
Fennica (1962) XIV diagnosed the mistake of the Late Learners as ignorance of different uses of 
‘is’. Frede (1967: 60, 61-67) has a different analysis of the distinction of different senses of ‘is’, 
and Brown “The Sophist on Statements, Predication, and Falsehood,” in G. Fine (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Plato (Oxford University Press 2008) 437-462 thinks that ‘is’ is not the locus of the 
ambiguity, but the construction of the sentence. 
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something that allows for things to hold relations, i.e. be together in some way, and for 
the proper qualifications needed to formulate statements and talk about Not-Being. WF at 
259E4-6 must be something that allows us to coherently talk about Not-Being and say 
“man is good” although man and good are different things.  
The back-reference (ὅ καὶ piρόσθεν εἴρηται, 259C7) found in the Eleatic 
Visitor’s criticism of the Late Learners (258B9-D8) appears to go back to those 
qualifications and to 258E6-259B7, where the theory of the WF is summarized.13 
According to 258E6-259B7, Not-Being is, and it cannot be bare non-entity or 
nothingness (258E6-259B7). Not-Being is because kinds mix with one another and in 
                                                 
13
 According to Frede (1962: 42) the back-reference is to 251E-252C9. I find more natural to take 
it to the closer 258B9-D8. Nonetheless, the two passages, 258B9-D8 and 251E-252C9, have the 
same implications. 251E-252C9 argues that (i) “if nothing has any capacity at all to associate with 
something for any result (“for any result” is the translation of εἰς µηδέν suggested by Campbell 
L. The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, with a Revised Text and English Notes (Clarendon Press 
1867)), then neither Change, nor Rest”—and this holds for everything whatsoever—“nothing 
would participate in any way in Being” (251E9-10). And if that is the case, we can add, then 
neither Change, nor Rest, would be and there would be neither Change, nor Rest—nor anything at 
all. Not only that, “if nothing has any capacity at all to associate with something for any result” 
(251E9), i.e. “if there is no mixing together” (252B6), then these theories, or for that matter any 
theory, “would not say anything” (252B5), presumably because there would not be anything to 
speak about, let alone anybody to speak with. (Contrary to what Frede (1967, 38) seems to 
suggest, I doubt that 252B1-6 is a different argument from 251E8-252A10) (ii) Moreover, if one 
forbids to call “anything by a term corresponding to a different thing because of a partaking [of 
that thing] in an affection (or property) of other thing” (252B9-10) (this is Campbell (1867) 
suggested translation with modifications), one would not be able to consistently apply the terms 
and qualifications ‘being’, ‘separate’, ‘of other things’, ‘by itself’, etc. (252C2-5), for these terms 
and qualifications assume that things relate to one another. In both passages 258E6-259B7 and 
251E-252C9 the interest is in things mixing and negative relations being something that obtains. 
258E6-259B7 describes a theory that explains such mixing, while 251E-252C9 is the formulation 
of the problem that leads to the postulation of the theory explained in 258E6-259B7. It should be 
noticed that 251E-252C9, directly follows and is a conclusion drawn from the criticism of the 
Late Learners (251A8-C6) who deny that man in any way mixes with good and therefore 
consider statements such as “man is good” to be meaningless. As a consequence, 251E-252C9 
concludes that things such as man and good mix, while 258E6-259B7 theorizes about Forms 
mixing. The dialogue does not discuss the connection between the mixing of things of 251E-
252C9 and the mixing of Forms in 254B-D alluded to in 258E6-259B7, but the alternatives we 
have is that the theory of the combination of Forms either exemplifies how things mix, or 
accounts for the mixing of things, or both exemplifies and accounts for the mixing of things. In 
any case, a connection is assumed between Forms and things in general, and what is a stake is not 
only a mixing of Forms but a mixing of entities in general. 
  11 
 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy Vol. VI 2012 Issue 2 
 
 
 
 
that mixing Being and Difference pass through one another and all things, with the result 
that, by mixing or participating in Being, Difference is, but also is not what Being is, 
because it is different from Being, and being different from Being it is a not-being. The 
same applies to Being itself. By participating in the Difference, Being is different from all 
other kinds, and by being different from all the other kinds, it is neither each one of those 
kinds nor they all together, but it is itself, i.e. Being. As a result, Being is a not-being, and 
for that reason there must be Not-Being (259B1-7).14  
The former is roughly the same theory and WF worked out at 254B-D, already 
anticipated at 251D-254B, and further developed at 254D-258D. It is a theory that 
provides qualifications on the way things are and are not in order to elucidate how things 
mix or relate to one another: Since there is a mixing of Forms, a Form can be said to be in 
respect to what it mixes with, and it can also be said not to be in respect to what it does 
not mix with, which can be just about everything it is not identical with. Man is thus good 
in the sense it mixes with the good, i.e. it is in respect to the good, and it is not good in 
the sense it is not the same thing as the good, i.e. it is not in respect to the good. 
 
                                                 
14
 It is far from clear how exactly these mixings are supposed to work. That is an issue I will not 
be handling in this paper. The terms ‘mixing’, ‘weaving’, and ‘partaking’ sometimes appear to be 
synonymous, although van Fraassen B. C. “Logical Structure in Plato’s Sophist,” Review of 
Metaphysics 22  (1969) (3) 482-498 distinguishes them. Independently of whether or not 
‘mixing’, ‘weaving’, and ‘partaking’ are synonymous, it is clear that the notion of partaking in the 
Sophist is vague and that the term ‘partaking’ refers to relations of different kind (Frede: 1967, 
38).  An ambiguity of the term συµpiλοκή and its cognate verb συµpiλέκειν I would like to point 
out, is that at 259E4-6 the συµpiλοκή at stake is clearly the Weaving (τὴν … συµpiλοκήν) of 
Forms in general or of all Forms (ἀλλήλλων τῶν εἰδῶν), i.e. the way the world of Forms is 
organized—and by implication how the world as a whole including particulars is organized—not 
a weaving of some particular Forms as it is the case at 240C2-3, 242D7-E2. It is crucial to bear 
this in mind, because συµpiλοκή in the latter sense is a συµpiλοκή and may amount to the same 
thing as a mixing, whereas in the former sense, the συµpiλοκή of Forms with one another 
simultaneously includes Forms mixing and not mixing. It should also be noticed that the notion of 
‘mixing’ is puzzling. ‘Mixing of Forms’ in the Sophist is clearly not to be understood as the 
mixing that occurs when colours are mixed, for in contrast to mixed colours mixed Forms do not 
lose their distinctive feature(s). The mixing of words is by far clearer. When a noun and a verb 
mix, it occurs that the whole, i.e. the result of the mixing, says something different and above 
what the noun and the verb separately say on their own, and yet both the noun and the verb 
themselves do not change in any way. 
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Now, if we consider the development of the whole passage 258C7 to 259E6—
where (i) Parmenides is declared defeated (258C7-E5), (ii) the new championing theory 
is recapitulated (258E6-259B8), (iii) people who do not comply to it, e.g. the Late 
Learners, are criticized for their incapacity to argue and make qualifications that will 
allow for things to hold some relation (259B9-D8), and (iv) it is contented that if the new 
theory were not the case, and if things that are different had not some kind of relation 
despite being different, then statements (259E4-6), let alone Philosophy, which relies on 
statements, would not be possible (260A5-B2)—it becomes apparent that we are dealing 
with an argument to the effect that if there were no WF (258E6-259B8, 258B9-D8), i.e. if 
the new theory were not the case and if things did not mix, there would be neither 
statements, nor Philosophy (259E4-6, 260A5-B2).  
This alleged argument appears to hinge on the obvious fact that there are 
statements, and if Parmenides and the Late Learners imply that there cannot be 
statements, their view must then be scandalously counterintuitive. The argument may 
even suggest, as it was previously remarked (252C5-9), that Parmenides and the Late 
Learners views are self-defeating insofar as they make statements in order to formulate 
views that in the last analysis deny statements.  
Unfortunately it is not crystal clear how this argument works, but part of my job 
in the rest of this paper will be to make a better sense of it. At this point, however, it 
should be clear that Hackforth, Bluck, and Peck, when they construe WF as looking 
forward, not only fail to see how 259E4-6 connects to its immediate context, but they 
also fail to understand the philosophical thread of though of the whole “Summary of the 
case against Parmenides” (258C-260B). Now, I would like to turn to Cornford’s, Ross’, 
and Ackrill’s interpretations.  
 
 
 
 
(III) Difficulties in Cornford’s, Ross’, Moravcsik’s, and Ackrill’s views  
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Cornford, Ross, Moravcsik, and Ackrill correctly interpret WF in 259E4-6 as the 
Weaving together of Forms such as Being, Sameness, Difference, Change, and Rest 
earlier exemplified in the dialogue at 254B-258C. However, they also claim that 259E4-6 
entails that a WF underlies every statement. This last claim is problematic for at least 
three different reasons. The first one, which—as I mentioned—was noticed by Cornford 
and Ross themselves, is that the paradigms of statement the Eleatic Visitor provides, i.e. 
“Theaetetus is sitting” and “Theaetetus is not flying,” are hard to reconcile with the claim 
that a WF underlies every statement. In “Theaetetus is sitting,” for instance, the subject 
term stands for a particular and only the predicate term, apparently, stands for a Form. 
And if only one term stands for a Form, Cornford and Ross cannot claim that a WF 
underlies every statement, because a WF must involve at least two Forms.  
In view of this difficulty, Cornford admitted that in some cases, when the subject 
term stands for a particular, a WF does not underlie the statement. Ross simply blames 
Plato for incurring in an over statement, thereby violating the principle of charity and not 
providing a reasonable explanation. Moravcsik, in turn, pretended to solve the problem 
by increasing the number of terms that can stand for a Form. In “Theaetetus is sitting,” 
according to him, two terms, copula and predicate, stand for two different Forms that are 
woven together.  
Moravcsik’s solution, however, will not do. One reason is that when Plato speaks 
of statement (ὁ λόγος) in 259E4-6, he seems to be making a general claim about all 
statements and is taking into consideration the class of statements as a whole. This is 
confirmed at 260a5-9, where the Visitor states “[it is a right moment] for the fact that 
statement is a particular one among the kinds that are ([ὡς ἐν καιρῷ] piρὸς τὸ τὸν 
λόγον ἡµῖν τῶν ὄντων ἕν τι γενῶν εἶναι), for if we are deprived of statement, we 
would be deprived of Philosophy, the most important thing.” Here ‘statement’ is 
considered as a class, the class that contains all statements and all subclasses of 
statements. Consequently, if there is no apparent reason to think that the Eleatic Visitor 
would not take “Plato is Aristocles” and “Plato is” to be statements, we must then read 
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259E4-6 as talking about any and every statement and including statements such as 
“Plato is Aristocles” and “Plato is.” The problem for Moravcsik’s theory is that it cannot 
account for these to kinds of statements, because in “Plato is” a particular and only one 
Form are involved, while in “Plato is Aristocles” subject and predicate stand for the same 
particular, so that only one term, the copula, could be said to stand for a Form, and with 
only one Form there cannot be a WF.15 One could perhaps talk of Socrates ‘unpacking’ a 
Form, e.g. human-being, but that does not appear to be necessarily implied by the text 
and has the disadvantage of making the theory more complex. 
A further reason why Cornford’s, Ross’, Moravcsik’s, and Ackrill’s claim that a 
WF underlies every statement is problematic is that it is just an assumption, not to say 
that it is bare speculation. There is not the slightest hint in the text at a WF underlying 
every meaningful statement. Third, Cornford, Ross, and Moravcsik make an apparently 
ungrounded transition from “the WF,” which is what the text has at 259E5-6 (τὴν 
ἀλλήλλων τῶν εἰδῶν συµpiλοκὴν), to “a WF.” They do not explain what prompts this 
transition and that seriously weakens their interpretations.  
Ackrill avoids the former errors and his is the best interpretation thus far.  While 
Cornford, Ross, and Moravcsik assume that 259E4-6 entails a direct connection between 
statements and the/a WF, such that every statement corresponds to a WF and is 
meaningful insofar as it corresponds to a WF, Ackrill takes that connection to be indirect 
and general, for he simply claims that the WF is an necessary ontological basic condition 
for the possibility of significant statements. Ackrill supports his account in two moves. 
First, he points out that according to the Sophist, if all Forms mixed, contradictory 
statements like “κίνησις ἵσταναι” would follow and be true, whereas if no Forms mixed, 
only tautological statements, or no statements at all, would be possible. For that reason, 
some Forms must mix with some other Forms and some do not mix with some other 
                                                 
15
 It might well be the case that Plato in the Sophist does not have in view statements like “Plato 
is Aristocles.” He seems to be concerned with statements where the subject term stands for either 
a Form or a particular and the predicate term for a Form. However, “Plato is” is a case where the 
subject term stands for a particular and the predicate term for a Form. 
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Forms. Second, he concludes that a statement is possible and meaningful because the 
Forms it contains include and rule out other Forms. The fact that some Forms mix with 
one another and some do not, entails that each Form includes other Forms and excludes 
others. The point Ackrill is ultimately making is that the Eleatic Visitor is putting his 
finger on the fact that a word applied to everything without exception is useless for the 
purpose of description and signification (2001, 77) because words are used to identify 
concepts and a concept can be identified only insofar as it excludes other concepts, and 
that is a necessary precondition for statements. 
No doubt Ackrill has hit on a necessary condition for statements. One may, 
however, doubt that it is the necessary condition the Eleatic Visitor has in mind. The 
problem with Ackrill’s interpretation is that although it makes reference to the fact that 
some Forms must mix with one another and some do not, it places emphasis on Forms or 
concepts as referents of words, while the Eleatic Visitor’s emphasis seems to be on the 
combination itself of Forms that makes reality and eventually statements possible. In 
order to better understand how exactly the WF conditions statements and what the Eleatic 
Visitor’s argument at 258E4-6 is, I propose we take a closer look at the text of 259E4-6.  
 
(IV) Logical Structure of  259E4-6 
 
(1) (1.1) Τελεωτάτη piάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις (1.2) τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀpiὸ piάντων·  (2) 
(2.1) διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλλων τῶν εἰδῶν συµpiλοκὴν (2) (2.2) ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡµῖν, (259E4-6). 
“(1) (1.1) A most complete disappearance of all statements is (1.2) the undoing of each thing 
from everything [else], (2) (2.1) because on account of the Weaving together of Forms with one 
another, (2.2) statements have come to be for us.” 
Plato’s phraseology in this passage is surprisingly convoluted. It is not clear what 
the relationship between the two statements involved is: 
(1) A most complete disappearance of all statements is to undo each thing from 
everything [else]. 
(2) On account of the Weaving together of Forms with one another statements have come 
to be for us. 
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 Let alone is unclear what the relationship between the cola of (1) is, 
(1.1) a most complete disappearance of all statements 
 (1.2) is the undoing of each thing from everything else. 
 nor is it clear how the two cola of (2) relate,  
 (2.1) because on account of the Weaving together of Forms with one another 
 (2.2) statements have come to be for us. 
 It is not completely clear what propositions (1) are telling us when they claim that 
‘(1.1) a most complete disappearance of all statements’ is ‘(1.2) the undoing of each thing 
from everything else’, in other words, that ‘(1.1) Non-Statement’ is ‘(1.2) Non-Weaving’. 
The point is certainly not that ‘Non-Statement’ is identical with ‘Non-Weaving’, which is 
obviously false, for these are manifestly two different concepts. It should also be 
emphasized that ‘Non-Weaving’ is not a predicate of ‘Non-Statement’, for ‘Non-
Weaving’ in the Greek, as the article shows (τὸ διαλύειν ἀpiὸ piάντων), is a subject.  
Propositions (1), therefore, do not intend to express identity of subject and predicate and 
must claim that ‘(1.2) Non-Weaving’ is ‘(1.1) Non-Statement’. So it seems we have no 
other choice but to understand propositions (1) as claiming that if there is ‘Non-
Weaving’, there is ‘Non-Statement,’ i.e. that ‘Non-Weaving’ implies ‘Non-Statement’. 
We can thus express (1) as: (1) ‘(1.2) if there is no Weaving, (1.1) then there is no 
Statement,’ or (1) ‘(1.2) Non-Weaving implies (1.1) Non-Statement’. Since (1) is a 
counterfactual, Plato must be assuming that ‘Non-Weaving’ is not the case and 
‘Weaving’ is the case, and that ‘Statement’ being the case depends on ‘Weaving’ being 
the case and ‘Non-Weaving’ not being the case. 
Propositions (2), on the other hand, tell us that ‘(2) (2.2) Statements are (2.1) on 
account of Weaving’. Here ‘on account of’ (διά) suggests that ‘Statements’ being the 
case depends on ‘Weaving’ being the case, and that it is not the case that ‘Statements’ are 
the case and ‘Weaving’ is not the case. Proposition (2) therefore states that ‘(2.2) 
Statements imply (2.1) Weaving.’ ‘On account of’ indicates beyond any doubt that (2) is 
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an implication, and since (1) and (2) have a parallel structure, then (2) confirms that (1) is 
also an implication. 
Interestingly enough, proposition (1) ‘Non-Weaving implies Non-Statement’ is a 
transposition of proposition (2) ‘Statements imply Weaving’. This is astonishing because 
the two statements are equivalent and in the end state exactly the same thing, namely that 
‘it is not the case that Weaving is not the case and Statements are the case’, i.e. ‘it is not 
the case that Statements are the case and Weaving is not the case’. One wonders what the 
point of stating in the same breath statements (1) and (2) is. A clue may be provided by 
the fact that proposition (2) is introduced by a ‘for’, ‘because’, or ‘in fact’ (γάρ), which 
indicates that (2) ‘Statements imply Weaving’ should explain or confirm (1) ‘Non-
Weaving implies Non-Statements’. However, since (1) and (2) are equivalent, there is no 
apparent logical reason why (2) should explain (1). Moreover, since (1) and (2) state 
exactly the same state of affairs and are equivalent, there is no reason why (2) should 
ontologically explain (1). 
A possible reason why (2) explains or confirms (1) is that (2)—unlike (1)—is 
presented in positive terms and is therefore simpler than (1). While (1) talks of “complete 
disappearance of statements,” i.e. of there not being statements, (2) talks of there being 
statements. Unfortunately this account does not seem to shed much light on the text. A 
second possibility is that (2) does not explain (1) in logical or ontological terms but in 
terms related to the text or context, in terms of how the information is presented to the 
reader. If that is the case, then WF in (2) should explain or confirm with the context’s 
help why “the undoing of each thing from everything else” in (1) entails “a most 
complete disappearance of all statements.” This is in harmony with 259E4-E being a 
transitional passage that is drawing a conclusion on the basis of premises already known 
and is perhaps presenting information already discussed under a new light.  
All this indicates that at this stage in the dialogue the Eleatic Visitor feels entitled 
to claim that there would not be statements if Forms were not woven, because it has 
already been proven that the existence of a WF is a necessary condition for reality and 
statements. The introduction of the counterfactual ‘(1) if there is no WF, then there is no 
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statements’ is thus assumed to be supported by a previous proof of the WF.  Further, if 
the WF is an ontology that makes possible statements and 259E4-6 takes that ontology to 
be a given fact, it then follows that, as (2) states, if there are statements, it cannot be the 
case that there is not WF, because statements entail the WF, insofar as the WF is a 
necessary condition for statements. From this vantage point, we can paraphrase the 
passage as follows:  
“We can conclude that (1) (1.1) there would not be statements, (1.2) if there were no 
Weaving of Forms, (2) (2.1) because we have already made clear that the Weaving of 
Forms is (2.2) a necessary condition for statements.” 
If this analysis is correct, it turns out that in order to understand 259E4-6, it will 
not suffice to grasp what WF means, but we also need to grasp from the context what is 
the relationship between the WF and “the undoing of each thing from everything else,” 
and, of course, what “the undoing of each thing from everything else” is. Not only that, 
since both (1) and (2) talk about statements, we should expect that something about 
statements—that will help us understand 259E6-4—has already been said.  However, 
before embarking on that elucidation there is something about the logical structure of the 
passage to be noticed. Since (1) ‘Non-Weaving’ implies ‘Non-Statement’ and  (2) 
Statements imply Weaving, (1) and (2) exclude the possibility of statements without WF, 
but not the possibility of WF without statements, so that the WF makes statements 
possible and determines them, while statements do not determine the WF in any way. It 
follows from this that the WF is logically, and as we shall see also ontologically, prior to 
statements.  I will return to this point in section (VII). 
 
(V) The ‘undoing of each thing from everything else’ and assumptions 259E4-6 makes 
about statements  
 
What does “the undoing of each thing from everything else” mean and imply for 
statements? As we have seen, Ackrill was right to emphasize that if all Forms mixed 
contradictory statements like “κίνησις ἵσταναι” would follow and be true, that if no 
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Forms mixed, only tautological statements, or no statements at all, would be possible, and 
therefore Forms must weave with one another in such a way that some mix and some do 
not mix. Yet, he was wrong to hastily speculate and conclude that the point made at 
259E4-6 is that a statement is possible and meaningful because the Forms, i.e. ‘concepts’, 
it contains include and rule out other Forms, i.e. ‘concepts’. That is only part of the story. 
He needed to inquire what the Eleatic Visitor says or suggests about statements in 
connection with the WF and its contrary opposite, i.e. “the undoing of each thing from 
everything else”. 
Ackrill’s act of speculation is nonetheless understandable. The example of WF at 
254D7-B gives no explicit hint at the relationship between the WF and statements. 
However, the purpose of that example is to illustrate a theory that avoids the flaws of the 
theories of the Pluralists (242C-244B), Parmenides (244B-245E), the Materialists (245E-
248A), the Friends of Forms (248A-251A), and the Late Learners (251A-C). Those flaws 
amount to making reality, as we know it, impossible, as well as producing theories that 
are incompatible with language. This is particularly obvious in the inconsistencies of 
Parmenides’ and the Late Learners’ theories.16 
According to the Sophist, Parmenides’ theory is inconsistent because it holds that 
the whole (τὸ piᾶν) is one (ἕν) in the sense of non-plurality, and at the same time calls it 
Being. Parmenides pleads for the existence of only one entity, but applies two words to 
one referent, and assumes thus the existence of at least three entities (244B6-D12).17 
                                                 
16
 The Friends of Forms make impossible certain important relations among things. They 
distinguish between things that come to be and things that are. Things that come to be are grasped 
by sense perception and have the power to affect or being affected, while things that are, are 
grasped by reason and cannot affect or be affected. One problem with this theory is that it cannot 
account for the knowledge if Forms are the objects of knowledge because knowing supposes that 
the object of knowledge affects the knower and is affected by the knower that grasps it (247E7-
249D4). The materialists’ view conflicts with the facts of the world. Since they say that here are 
only bodily things, meaning by that that there are only things that can be touched, they do not 
account for things that cannot be touched, such as soul and justice (245E5-247E6).  
17
 There is disagreement as to how to construe this passage. Bluck (1975: 72) believes that at 
244D1 the participle ἕχον goes with ὄνοµα and takes the text to mean: “since it [i.e. the name] 
could not explain itself.” According to Ackrill (1957: 73) the argument “simply suggests that if 
names exists they must designate things other than themselves.” De Rijk (1986: 96) takes ἕχον to 
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Parmenides assumes the opposite of what he preaches for! Yet, the text hints at a deeper 
problem. In order to argue that there is only one entity, Parmenides must make use of 
words, and that is inconsistent with what he intends to prove because the very same 
concept of word supposes the existence of at least two entities: a phonetic configuration 
and some other different object for which that phonetic configuration stands (244B6-
D9).18  The mere act of arguing for non-plurality refutes Parmenides simply because 
arguing supposes the use of words, and words imply more than one entity, not to mention 
that an argument consists of a considerable number of words.  
We learn four things from Parmenides’ flaws: (i) any theory must be consistent 
with what it claims, (ii) the world as we know it must consist in a plurality of entities, (iii) 
any theory about the ontology of the world as we know it must be consistent with the fact 
that the world consists in a plurality of entities, (iv) and any theory about the ontology of 
the world as we know it must be consistent with the fact that theories are formulated with 
words, statements, and arguments. 
The Late Learners, in contrast, accept the existence of a plurality of items. The 
problem is that they do not accept any relationship among those items. They believe 
people are wrong to claim that man is one thing F and ‘naming’ it many different things 
other than man (e.g. blue, thin, tall, unjust, just, etc) (251A9-B4). The Late Learners think 
that one thing cannot be many things [other than itself], nor can many things be one 
thing19 (251B7-C2). It follows from this, in the Late Learners’ view, that the statement 
                                                                                                                                                 
be an attribute and reads “some name which would be lacking (ouk an echon) sense.” De Rijk 
thinks Bluck is mistaken in remarking that the argument “simply suggests that if names exists 
they must designate things other than themselves.” The point made in the passage is, according to 
de Rijk, that “the Monist would be involved in self-contradiction if he were to attempt to avoid 
the ridiculous assumption of ‘One thing—two names’ by declaring the name ‘being’ to be an 
empty one, for in separating, then, the thing conceived of (pragma) from that empty name he 
would be faced, again, with two’things’.” 
18
 For that reason, Parmenides cannot reply that there is only one thing and that that thing is a 
name that names itself, i.e. a name that names nothing 
19
 The text says: “we name an object many things,” though the modern reader would expect either 
“we name an object in many ways,” which may make allusion to both reference and predication, 
or “we name an object with many different names” which makes allusion to reference. The Greek 
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‘man is good’ should state that the items man and good are the same thing. However, the 
terms ‘man’ and ‘good’ refer two different items and no item can be more than one thing. 
In other words, no item can be more than what it itself is. For that reason, according to 
the Late Learners, we should say ‘man is man’ and ‘good is good’, not ‘man is good’, and 
apparently, if we said ‘man is good’, ‘man’ and ‘good’ should refer the same thing. It 
also appears that the Late Learners would reject ‘man is not good’ because they believe 
we cannot say anything about man that is not man.  
It follows from this that according to the Late Learners only tautological 
statements such as ‘man is man’ are sound and meaningful, and—to use Aristotelian 
language—that any predication that attributes properties is unsound and meaningless.20 
At the logical level, the Late Learners do not accept the distinction between subject and 
predicate, for they accept only subjects and reject predicates. Correspondingly, at the 
ontological level, they do not distinguish bearers of properties and properties, reject 
properties, and only accept entities that do not bear properties. And since it seems they 
would not accept “Plato is to the left,” it appears they do not even accept any relation 
whatsoever among items. 
                                                                                                                                                 
uses the verb ἐpiονοµάζειν, which literally means: “to attribute a name”, though it may 
occasionally mean: “to attribute a qualification”. When we name, we apply by means of 
convention a phonetic configuration to something, but when we state, we say that something is a 
quality or property of something. It is important to be clear about the ambiguity of the term 
because the Late Learners do not recognize at all a distinction between naming and stating.  
20
 A tautological statement does not attribute a property. It is redundant and strictly speaking it 
does not suppose a distinction between subject and predicate terms. In a way we could say that 
such a statement has only subject terms, and if at the logical level we have only subject terms, 
then at the ontological level we have no distinction among classes of entities and all entities stand 
in the same class and rank, in this case the subject class. I would disagree with Cornford, who 
claims that the theory of the Late Learners is a theory of predication. In my view, by restricting 
the formulation of statements to tautologies, e.g. ‘man is man’, the Late Learners properly 
speaking eliminate predication understood as the attribution of a property or quality, for they, 
strictly speaking, eliminate the class of predicate terms. It seems that the Late Learners have no 
interest at all in predication. They think statements refer or stand for something. They think, for 
instance, that ‘man is good’ is meaningless because man is nothing else than man, and ‘man is 
good’ therefore cannot stand for anything. ‘Man is man’, in contrast, is meaningful because there 
is such thing as man that is man and ‘man is man’ stands for that. 
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The Late Learners propose a world that consists in a plurality of isolated items 
that bear no relation whatsoever to one another. A problem with this ontological picture 
is that if items are unrelated, i.e. do not mix with one another, how can we possible say 
that they do not mix and weave with one another? When some one says that items do not 
mix with one another, she is inevitable associating them in some way!  
Suppose, for instance, that X and Y are not the same item, that X is not a property 
of Y, nor Y a property of X, that there is no specific connection or relation between X 
and Y that involves one of these items affecting or being affected by the other or even 
having a Cambridge relation with the other.21 Yet, even if they do not hold any of the 
relations just mentioned, insofar as there is X and there is Y, there is a relation X and Y 
cannot avoid having, and that is being different from one another. If each of them is an 
individual item of its own, then X and Y cannot fail to be different from one another and 
although they do not mix—in the sense that they are not the same, none is a property of 
the other, and they do not hold any causal or Cambridge relation to one another—we 
cannot say that they do not hold any relation with one another, i.e. that they do not weave 
with one another. Insofar as X and Y are each an individual item of its own, and insofar 
as they belong to the same domain or world (see 242C8-244B4), they cannot avoid being 
different, weaving together, and holding some relation. By just being and being in the 
same domain or world, items already hold some kind of relation or weaving. 
A consequence of this is that when someone claims that items do not mix with 
one another, he must assume that there are several items distinguishable and different 
from one another, and that already involves a relation. If some one takes some items to be 
                                                 
21
 A Cambridge relation is a relation X holds with Y, such that it holds at some time T1 but not at 
a time T2, and holding or not holding does not affect in any way the intrinsic properties of X and 
Y. E.g. at T1 X is to the left of Y and Y to de right of X, and at T2 Y is to the left of X and X to 
the right of Y. The relation between X and Y changes from T1 to T2, and the extrinsic properties 
of X and Y also change from T1 to T2. However, the intrinsic properties of X and Y do not 
change from T1 to T2, X and Y remain each X and Y correspondingly. Some relations have a 
grater impact on the intrinsic properties of their relata. E.g. Methane combines with oxygen in the 
air to make carbon dioxide and water vapor (CH4 + 2 02 →CO2 +2H20), i.e. as soon as methane 
relates to oxygen their intrinsic properties change. 
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distinguishable and different from one another and be in the same domain or world, she 
ipso facto takes those items to hold a certain relation, for to be in the same domain or 
world and be different already involves a relation. So one can deny that things are mixed 
in the sense of not being the same, not being one a property of the other, not holding any 
causal or Cambridge relation, only if one assumes they are mixed in a primordial way, 
i.e. only if one assumes they are woven together.  
As in the case of Parmenides’ theory, the Late Learners are faulty of 
inconsistency, for it seems that in order to formulate their theory they need to assume 
what they reject. Moreover, it is not possible to formulate their theory unless reality is 
ontologically organized in exactly the opposite way their theory preaches. From the flaws 
of the Late Learners we learn that (i) the world must not only consist in a plurality of 
items, but those items must also relate to one another, (ii) any theory must be consistent 
with the fact that the world consists in a plurality of entities that relate to one another, (iii) 
as well as with the fact that theories are formulated with sentences that claim relations 
among things, and (iv) by just being and being in the same domain or world, items 
already hold some kind of weaving. 
By criticizing Parmenides the Eleatic Visitor shows that the world consists in a 
plurality of items and that language supposes a plurality of items. By criticizing the Late 
Learners he shows that it is fundamental to the ontological constitution of reality that it 
consists in a plurality of items that bear a necessary and fundamental relation or weave 
with one another.  
However, despite fact that reality consists in a plurality of items that bear a 
necessary and fundamental relation or weave with one another and it is obviously not the 
case that nothing relates in some way to something else, it can neither be the case that 
everything mixes with everything unrestrictedly. That would bring us back to 
Parmenides’ view, for If X mixed with Y unrestrictedly, X would have all the properties 
of Y and Y would have all the properties of X, so that there would not be any distinction 
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between X and Y, and Y and X would be one single item (252D6-8).22 So if neither a 
one-entity ontology, nor a plurality of totally unrelated or unmixed entities, nor a plurality 
of entities that mix without any restriction is the case, then items must mix restrictively, 
which obviously entails that they must fail to mix unrestrictively (252E5-6), as a result 
some items must not mix, and there are specific rules for their mixing and not mixing.  
 “The undoing of each thing from everything [else], (259E4-5)” and “to … 
separate everything from everything else, (259D9-E1)” is then an ontology, or for that 
matter any ontology, that isolates items as the Late Learners and, in a even more radical 
way, Parmenides do. The WF is simply a theory that avoids these pitfalls, and 
interestingly enough is not defended in the Sophist as the only theory that avoids such 
pitfalls, so that the attentive reader is left to think that one could perhaps devise a 
different theory that satisfies the very same ontological conditions. This suggests that the 
ultimate and indisputable asset of the WF is the fact that it abides by the basic ontological 
conditions Parmenides and the Late Learners disregard.  
The ontological conditions Parmenides and the Late Learners fail to meet are 
extremely general. They are conditions that determine the possibility of there being items 
that relate to one another, of which we can talk, and which we can know. For this reason, 
these conditions apply to the whole of reality, and as such they apply to everything that 
is. So if the WF only talks of Forms and does not (explicitly) mention particulars, that 
does not mean that what it says about Forms does not apply or has a direct impact on 
particulars, it must actually apply to them insofar as they are things that are, things that 
are part of reality. Under this light, 259E4-5 is to be understood as follows: 
(1) (1.1) there would not be statements, (1.2) if reality did not ultimately consists in a plurality of 
items that relate to one another in such a way that they mix and do not mix among themselves 
according to certain ontological rules [explained at 254B8-256D9]. (2) (2.1) On account of the 
ontological rules that make the Weaving together of Forms possible, which are rules that structure 
the whole of reality, (2.2) statements are also possible.  
                                                 
22
 This involves the inconsistencies diagnosed in the criticism of Parmenides’ theory, but also an 
ontological impossibility. If an entity simultaneously has every property and there are 
contradictory properties, that entity would simultaneously have contradictory properties. 
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Now, if the conditions that drive the Eleatic Visitor to postulate the WF are the 
most basic and most general ontological rules or conditions of reality, and if they apply to 
the whole of reality and everything that is, including Forms and particulars, then we 
should not be surprised by the Eleatic Visitor’s fluctuation from examples of statements 
involving combinations of Forms, e.g. “Change rests,” to examples that at first blush do 
not appear to involve combinations of Forms, e.g. “Theaetetus is sitting” (263A2), “man 
is good” (251B9-C1) and the non explicit or implicit exclusion in arguments of the 
possibility of statements that do not involve weavings of Forms, e.g. “Plato is 
Aristocles”, “Plato is.” 
Consequently, the Eleatic Visitor’s point at 259E4-6, pace Cornford, Ross, and 
Moravcsik, is not that every statement expresses or reproduces a WF, but that the WF 
determines the possibility of every statement independently of whether or not it expresses 
a mixing or non-mixing of forms, or a mixing or non-mixing of particulars and Forms, or 
perhaps even a mixing or non-mixing of Particulars.  
 
(VI) “The undoing of each thing from everything else” and statements  
 
Thus far it is clear what the WF and “the undoing of each thing from everything 
[else]” are. It is not fully clear, however, why would statements be impossible if items 
had no connection whatsoever with one another and did not connect according to the 
ontological rules the WF abides by. To answer this question we need to know what the 
Eleatic Visitor understands by statements. In the section subsequent to 259E4-6, between 
261C6 and 264B8, the Eleatic Visitor will explain that a statement is a weaving of words 
such that as a whole says something over and above and different from what the 
individual words it contains say on their own (262D2-6). However, we need not look 
forward in order to have an idea of what the Eleatic Visitor thinks statements are. Already 
in his criticism of the Late Learners, the Eleatic Visitor unpacks some views about 
statements.  
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The Late Learners—as we have already discussed—are criticized for maintaining 
that it is impossible to meaningfully state ‘man is good’. They claim that it is impossible 
for one thing to be meaningfully ‘named’ many things and for many things to be 
meaningfully ‘named’ one thing, i.e. it is impossible for one thing to be many things, and 
for many things to be one. In other words, they claim that if the variables X, Y, Z stand 
for different items, one can neither say ‘X is Y’, nor ‘X is Y, Z’, nor Y, Z is X. In their 
view, the terms of statements must stand for the same item and statements must have the 
form ‘X is X’. So that the item for which the first instance of ‘X’ stands is the same as the 
item for which the second instance of ‘X’ stands. It appears that if by chance a statement 
has the form ‘X is Y’, the Late Learners would think that if ‘X is Y’ is to be meaningful, 
then ‘X’ and ‘Y’ must stand for the same item.  
If this is what the Eleatic Visitor criticizes, then he must think that it is perfectly 
right to state ‘man is good’ and claim that one thing is many things and many things one. 
He must think that in a meaningful statement ‘X’ and ‘Y’ can stand for different items 
and the statement can state that the different items for which ‘X’ and ‘Y’ stand hold a 
certain relation. So the Eleatic Visitor must be committed to the view that a statement 
contains different terms that can stand for different items and expresses a relation among 
those items. 
 This makes a lot clearer what 259E4-6 intends to say. If reality did not ultimately 
consists in a plurality of items fundamentally and necessarily woven together in such a 
way that some mix with some and some do not mix with some according to certain 
ontological conditions, there would not be statements because statements consist of 
different linguistic terms that relate to one another and stand for different extra-linguistic 
items that relate to one another according to certain rules and conditions. So if reality did 
not consists in a plurality of different related items, there would not be statements insofar 
as statements express relations about extra-linguistic items. 
 If this is exactly what the Eleatic Visitor is telling us at 259E4-6, then the 
recapitulation and argument he is making through 258C-260B should be the following: (i) 
Having declared Parmenides defeated and having proven that an ontology that consists in 
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totally unrelated items is counterintuitive insofar it prevents the possibility of statements 
and language (258C7-E5), (ii) it is necessary to conclude that items relate to one another 
in such a way as to make language possible. A theory that satisfies this demand is the WF 
(258E6-259B8). (iii) This theory avoids the difficulties presented by Parmenides’ view, 
as well as those presented by the Late Learners, who think that reality consists in a 
plurality of items but take them not to relate in any way whatsoever with one another 
(258B9-D8), thereby preventing the possibility of statements and language. (iv) So if the 
new theory were not the case in the sense that items are totally isolated from one another, 
and if reality did not consist of a plurality of different related items but in one item or a 
plurality of items that bear no relation to one another, then statements (259E4-6, cf. 
258E6-259B8, 258B9-D8), let alone Philosophy (260A5-B2), which obviously relies on 
statements, would not be possible.   
 The point implied is not only that statements are an obvious piece of reality, so that 
denying statements is obviously counterintuitive, but also that denying statements is self-
contradictory because in order to deny statements, let alone in order to postulate a theory 
that denies statements, we need to be committed to the possibility of denying statements. 
And if we are committed to the possibility of denying statements, we are ipso facto 
committed to the possibility of formulating statements and the possibility of stating our 
denial of statements. Stating the impossibility of statements demands their possibility and 
the fact that there are statements allows us, interestingly enough, to affirm and deny 
them. Not only that, in order to deny the WF and that items relate to one another, we need 
to formulate a statement and be committed to the possibility of statements, and if we are 
committed to that, we are committed to saying something about something, which 
implies that we assume a plurality of items that relate to one another. So whoever denies 
statements, the WF, and that items relate to one another, is inconsistent and not in a 
position to seriously defend her view (258B9-D8). The view that items do not mix or do 
not weave at all, i.e. that there is no WF, and that statements are impossible is self-
defeating, as it was already anticipated at 252C5-9. 
 We can now conclude that (1.2) if items did not relate to one another, (1.1) there 
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would not be statements, and it would be impossible to state that items do not relate to 
one another, as well as that they relate to one another. (2.1) But if items relate to one 
another, then there can be statements, and it would be possible to state both that 
statements are impossible as well as that they are possible. Any theory that claims that 
items do not relate to one another and that statements are impossible, is then not only 
scandalously counterintuitive and inconsistent, but also self-defeating.  
 
(VII) The relationship between the WF and statements implicit in 259E4-6 
 
Interestingly enough, in 259E4-6 the Eleatic Visitor is assuming that the existence 
of statements is a reliable touchstone for proving the consistency and feasibility of an 
ontological theory. As we have seen, he appears to believe that every ontological theory 
must be consistent with statements, and if every theory is formulated linguistically and 
involves statements, then—on the face of it—every theory must be consistent with 
statements. Perhaps he is even thinking that the existence of language and statements is 
per se obvious, simply because if we do not accept language and statements, we cannot 
get off the ground to speak, think, theorize, and philosophize about anything (see 261A5-
B2). Yet, as his analysis of “Theaetetus is not flying” into “Theaetetus partakes in 
Difference in respect to flying” and his consideration that we can meaningfully say 
“Theaetetus is flying” shows, the Eleatic Visitor would not go as far as to say that the 
way we normally speak and whatever we state is necessarily a touchstone or evidence for 
proving anything about reality.  
 This brings us to a feature of 259E4-6 that still remains unexplained. I mentioned 
at the end of (IV) that the logical structure of (1) and (2) excludes the possibility of 
statements without WF, but not the possibility of WF without statements, so that the WF 
determines the possibility of statements and is logically and—as we have just seen— 
ontologically prior to statements, whereas statements do not determine the WF in any 
way. The relation between the WF and statements is asymmetrical and its direction is 
from the WF to statements. This entails that the WF is ontologically independent from 
  29 
 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy Vol. VI 2012 Issue 2 
 
 
 
 
statements, but statements ontologically depend on the WF, so there can be WF without 
there being statements, but there cannot be statements without there being WF.  
Now, if the Eleatic Visitor holds that the WF ontologically determines the 
possibility of statements in general terms but not the way we normally speak and what we 
can possibly state, then he must think that the WF completely determines the possibility 
of statements, but does not determine, at least completely, the structure, composition, and 
content of statements, while statements, their structure, constitution, and content have no 
impact whatsoever on the WF. This is crucial to understanding how Plato conceives of 
the relationship between the WF and statements.  
 The exact relationship between the WF and statements becomes apparent in the 
loose parallelism the Eleatic Visitor draws between (i) the weaving together of letters, (ii) 
the weaving together of words that issues statements, and (iii) the WF. This is obviously 
a parallelism between (i) the combinations of letters that issue syllables (and eventually 
words), (ii) the combinations of words that issue statements, and (iii) the ontological 
features of the WF.  
 This parallelism hinges on the letter analogy, which runs as follows:  
(i) Consonants cannot (directly) combine or mix with consonants. They can, however, 
(directly) mix with vowels, and by the bridging of vowels they can (indirectly) mix with 
other consonants (253A4-6).  
(ii) In the same way, words cannot mix as to produce statements unless they come in two 
different kinds (261D6-E6), i.e. vowel- (i.e. verbs, ῥήµατα) and consonant-words (i.e. 
nouns, ὀνόµατα) (262A1-7) (261D1-3), so that consonant-words do not (directly) mix 
with consonant-words but  (directly) mix with vowel-words (262A9-11). The strings ‘lion 
deer horse’ and ‘walks runs sleeps’ are not mixings and do not issue a statement because 
the words they contain do not show or say as a whole anything above what they say on 
their own individually (262B1-262C7), whereas in ‘ἄνθρωpiος µανθάνει’, ‘ἄνθρωpiος’ 
and ‘µανθάνει’, which are words of different kind, do not simply name each on its own 
something different separately, but both terms in combination and as a whole say 
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something about man and learning, namely that a man is undertaking the action of 
learning (see 262D2-6). Whether by the bridging of vowel-words consonant-words 
(indirectly) mix, that is something we need to examine.  
(iii) In the case of Forms, similarly, Forms cannot mix with every Form, for otherwise 
self-contradictory statements such as “κίνησις ἵσταναι” would be true. If some Forms 
are to mix and some are not to mix, then there must be two kinds of Forms, consonant- 
and vowel-Forms, so that consonant-Forms do not (directly) mix with consonant-Forms 
but (directly) mix with vowel-Forms (253B9-C3, 253D5-E2, 255C14-D1).23 As in the 
case of words, whether consonant-Forms (indirectly) mix by the bridging of vowel-
Forms, that is something that needs to be scrutinized. 
 This analogy among letters as elements of syllables, words as elements of 
statements, and the WF must be taken very loosely, for it is an oversimplification and 
incomplete. There are important disanalogies among letters, words as elements of 
statements, and the WF. To begin with, it is true that in the layman’s view virtually any 
consonant can combine with any vowel, and any vowel my function as a bridge to link 
any two consonants. Similarly, any mixing of a consonant-word and a vowel-word is 
syntactically possible, e.g. “procrastination flies” makes perfect sense. Yet, we cannot 
really say that a vowel-word can link any two consonant-words, for although 
“procrastination kills serendipity” makes sense, “procrastination dies serendipity” does 
not. This disanalogy, however, is not too crucial. Highly misleading, though, would be to 
fully apply the parallelism to the WF. It is correct to say that consonant-Forms combine 
with any vowel-Form, for vowel Forms are Being, Sameness, and Difference and 
everything ‘is’ and is in some way ‘the same’ and ‘different.’ Yet, we cannot say that any 
two consonant Forms, e.g. Change and Rest, could be bridged by any vowel Form, e.g. 
Being, for if that were the case, it will then be possible for Change to be Rest and vise 
versa. The letter analogy falls short of the weaving of words and the WF because the 
                                                 
23
 I will not discuss here whether Plato means by γράµµατα letters or phonemes. See Ryle, G. 
“Letters and Syllables in Plato,” Philosophical Review (1960) 69 (4):  431-451. 
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weaving of words and the WF are more complex and have more restrictions than the 
weaving of letters. All this indicates that the weaving of words is more complex and has 
more restrictions than the weaving of letters, and that the WF is more complex and has 
more restrictions than the weaving of words.24 
 This criticism of the letter analogy shows that although we can mix the terms 
‘Change’ and ‘Rests’, the extra-linguistic items Change and Rest do not mix. The terms 
of a statement stand for extra-linguistic items, but the statement itself need not express a 
weaving (mixing or non-mixing) of extra-linguistic items. A statement, therefore, is a 
weaving of words that may or may not find a counter part in the extra-linguistic world. 
Statements such as “Theatetus is sitting” or “Change is not Rest” do consist of words that 
stand for items that obtain in the extra-linguistic world and express relations among items 
that also obtain in the extra-linguistic world, and for that reason they are said to be true  
(263B4-5), whereas statements such as “Theaetetus flies” and “Change is rests” consist 
of words that stand for items that obtain in the extra-linguistic world, but they do not 
express relations among extra-linguistic items that obtain in the extra-linguistic world 
(263B7-9). As Plato puts it, such statements assert things (i.e. relations) that are not, i.e. 
that are different from what obtains of the subject term (263D1-4), and for that reason 
they are said to be false. While Change being the same thing as Rest and Change being at 
rest are ontologically impossible, “Change is Rest” and “Change rests” are linguistically 
possible. If there is a linguistic impossibility, that would be to pretend that ‘Theatetus 
Plato’ or ‘sitting flying’ say something over and above their elements and constitute 
statements.  
 This all leads us to conclude that if 259E4-6 is telling us that (1.2.) “the he undoing 
of each thing from everything else” implies (1.1.) “the impossibility of statements”, and  
if (2.2.) “the existence of statements” implies (2.1) the WF, then the logical structure of 
this text is giving us a hint at the fact that statements work differently than the extra-
linguistic world, i.e. that the weaving of words works differently than the weaving of 
                                                 
24
 There is a lot more to be said about the latter analogy, but I have to postpone that to a different 
occasion. 
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extra-linguistic items. Consequently, the text is consistent with the possibility of 
statements having rules and features of their own fully independent from those of the 
extra-linguistic world.25  
 
(VIII) Conclusion  
 
 We are finally prepared to make sense of Sophist 259E4-6: 
(1) (1.1) Τελεωτάτη piάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις (1.2) τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀpiὸ piάντων·  (2) 
(2.1) διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλλων τῶν εἰδῶν συµpiλοκὴν (2) (2.2) ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡµῖν, (259E4-6). 
“(1) (1.1) A most complete disappearance of all statements is (1.2) the undoing of each thing 
from everything [else], (2) (2.1) because on account of the Weaving together of Forms with one 
another, (2.2) statements have come to be for us.” 
Bluck, Hackforth, and Peck were wrong to construe this passage out of its 
context. The Eleatic Visitor may have agreed with Peck that statements are among the 
things that are. However, his concern at 259E4-6 is not to show that statements are 
among the things that are but to show that reality, i.e. things that are, must fulfill certain 
ontological conditions in order for statements to be possible. The point made by 259E4-6, 
pace Cornford, Ross, and Moravcsik is not that statements must contain Forms but that 
statements in order to be what they are must abide by the basic rules of reality. Ackrill 
was right to say that the WF is a necessary condition for significant non-self-
contradictory statements. However he does not do justice to the text in suggesting that the 
Eleatic Visitor intends to say that a word applied to everything without exception is 
useless for the purpose of description and signification because words are used to identify 
concepts and a concept can be identified only insofar as it excludes other concepts.  
At 259E4-6 the Eleatic Visitor is simply telling us that after refuting Parmenides 
and the Late Learners and having identified what conditions an ontology must fulfill in 
                                                 
25
 The application of the letter analogy to both Forms/items and statements also shows that the 
Eleatic stranger is not analyzing statements into Subject and Predicate or terms that stand for 
entities that are bearers of properties in contrast to entities that are properties. His analysis is 
rather into consonant and vowel terms.  
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order to be compatible with the existence of statements, he can conclude that (1) (1.1) 
there would not be statements, (1.2) if reality did not ultimately consists in a plurality of 
items that relate or weave with one another in such a way that some mix with some and 
some do not mix with some according to certain ontological rules.  (2) The reason for that 
is that (2.1) on account of the ontological conditions and rules that make the WF possible, 
which are conditions and rules that regulate the whole of reality, (2.2) statements are also 
possible. The Eleatic Visitor is nailing down the fact that if reality did not ultimately 
consists in a plurality of items some of which mix with some and some of which do not 
mix with some according to certain ontological rules, there would not be statements 
because statements consist in the weaving of different linguistic terms that stand for 
different extra-linguistic items that bear some relation to one another.  
The WF here is not to be understood as any particular weaving of two or more 
forms, but in a more general sense as the basic ontological conditions that make both 
reality and statements possible. That is confirmed by the fact that those basic ontological 
conditions compatible with the WF are the contrary of “the undoing of each thing from 
everything [else].” For this very reason, the Eleatic Visitor cannot be telling us at 259E4-
6 that a statement must necessarily contain a WF. He must rather be telling us that 
statements suppose and imply the basic conditions of reality identified in his critique of 
Parmenides and the Late Learners.  
The passage assumes a certain parallelism between statements and the WF.  Just 
as items have to come in at least two different kinds in order to constitute a reality that 
consists in a plurality of entities that do not mix indiscriminately, in the same way words 
in order to constitute statements must come in at least two different kinds. 26 However, 
this parallelism is to be taken cum grano salis. The logical structure of 259E4-6 implies 
that the WF determines the possibility of there being statements, although the Eleatic 
Visitor also thinks that the WF does not determine the way we normally speak and what 
we can possibly state. This indicates that he must be aware that the syntactic form and 
                                                 
26
 At 261D2 ff. ὀνόµατα is used in the general sense of ‘word’, but at 261E4 ff. it is used in the 
much narrower sense of name or noun in opposition to ῥήµατα. 
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structure of a statement need not reproduce or be completely analogical to the structure of 
the combination of items it pretends to express.  
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